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Interest in agent-oriented technology continues to grow, both at a theoretical level and a practical
level, with the UK maintaining a strong representation in the area in both academic institutions and
commercial organisations. In December 1997, the Second UK Workshop on Foundations of Multi-
Agent Systems (FoMAS’97), held at the University of Warwick, built on the success of FoMAS’96 a
year earlier (Luck, 1997; Doran et al., 1997; d’Inverno et al., 1997; Fisher et al., 1997) in seeking to
provide a forum for academics and industrialists within the UK to present and discuss current direc-
tions in research and applications development. Supported by the EPSRC and HP Labs, FoMAS’97
was expanded to two days with invited presentations from Professor Ken Binmore of UCL, and Pro-
fessor Cristiano Castelfranchi of the Italian National Research Council’s Institute of Psychology, in
addition to paper presentations and panel discussions. The aim again was to provide an opportunity
for promoting and supporting activity in the research and development of multi-agent systems.
The two panels, which were concerned with Agent Systems and Applications, and Agent Ratio-
nality, comprising leading academics and industrialists, each generated stimulating and sometimes
heated debates. Reports on these panel discussions follow separately. In this report, we summarise
the other contributions to the workshop through paper presentations and invited talks, which cover a
wide range of relevant topics. The structure of the report reflects the organisation of the workshop.
The workshop began with an invited talk from Castelfranchi, who focussed on foundations of
multi-agent systems with a social and psychological perspective. His starting point is the new AI of
the ’90s in which an important stream is artificial social intelligence. The main claims of the talk
can be summarised as follows. First, the real foundation of all sociality (cooperation, competition,
groups, organisation, etc.) is individual social action and mind. One cannot reduce or connect action
at the collective level to action at the individual level unless one passes through the social character
of individual action. Second, important levels of coordination and cooperation necessarily require
minds and cognitive agents (beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.). However, cognition, communication
and agreement are not enough for modelling and implementing cooperation: emergent pre-cognitive
structures and constraints should be formalised, and emergent forms of cooperation are also needed
among planning and deliberative agents. The final claim was that we are going towards a synthetic
paradigm in AI and Cognitive Science, reconciling situatedness and plans, reactivity and mental rep-
resentations, cognition, emergence and self-organisation.
This report summarises the paper presentations at the Second UK Workshop on Foundations of Multi-Agent Systems.
It is based on contributions from the presenters, edited by the workshop and session chairs.
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In relation to this dialectic view of the relation between micro and macro levels (Conte and Castel-
franchi, 1995) and to this synthetic paradigm, the importance of AI and multi-agent systems for social
simulation and social theory was illustrated, by devoting attention to the most challenging theoreti-
cal problem of the social sciences: the problem of unplanned and non-contractual social organisation
and cooperation; i.e. von Hayek’s problem of spontaneous order and Adam Smith’s problem of the
invisible hand. This is claimed to be the same as the theory of social functions in anthropology and
sociology in which functions install and maintain themselves thanks to, and through, agents’ mental
representations but not as mental representations, i.e., without being known or at least intended. How
is this possible in cognitive and intentional agents? Intentions seem to make social functions super-
fluous for explaining behaviour. We need, in fact, a strange kind of behavior in intentional agents,
namely a behavior that is goal-oriented, finalistic, but not goal-directed, non intentional. A possi-
ble solution to this problem is to be found in a theory of cognitive reinforcement in which functions
are just effects of the behavior of the agents, that go beyond the intended effects and succeed in re-
producing themselves because they reinforce the beliefs and the goals of the agents that caused that
behavior.
It follows that behavior is goal-directed and reason-based, i.e., is intentional action. The agent
bases its goal-adoption, its preferences and decisions, and its actions on its beliefs (as a cognitive
agent), some effect of which is unknown or unintended by the agent. Then, in a circular causality, a
feedback loop from those unintended effects reinforces the beliefs or goals that generated the actions.
This reinforcement increases the probability that in similar circumstances (activating the same beliefs
and goals) the agent will produce the same behavior, reproducing the effects. At this point such effects
are no longer accidental or unimportant, and although remaining unintended they are teleonomically
produced: that behavior exists thanks to its unintended effects, it was selected by these effects, and it
is functional to them. Even if these effects could be negative for the goals or the interests of (some
of) the involved agents, their behavior is goal-oriented to these effects. There are two cognitive
reinforcement principles: belief reinforcement, and goal reinforcement. Both are reinforced in two
ways: with respect to their accessibility (activation) and reliability (confirmation). The reinforcement
of both the belief and the goal/plan will determine a reinforcement of that behavior in a cognitive-
intentional agent. In summary, the relationship between emergence and intentionality was claimed to
be the most challenging issue for both cognitive agent architectures and for the theory of social agents
and social behaviour.
In the first presentation in the paper session, Parsons described work carried out in collabora-
tion with Sierra and Jennings at Queen Mary and Westfield College, London. There are many ways
of designing and building agent systems. However, the most common means is probably through
an agent architecture. The role of such architectures is to define a separation of concerns — they
identify the main functions which ultimately give rise to the agent’s behaviour and they define the
interdependencies between them. This approach to system design affords all the traditional advan-
tages of modularisation in software engineering (Sommerville, 1992) and enables complex artifacts
to be designed out of simpler components. However, one problem with much of the work on agent
architectures is that it is somewhat ad hoc in nature. There is often little connection between the spec-
ification of the architecture and its implementation. This work aims to rectify this rather undesirable
situation. The crux of the work is to see that Giunchiglia’s multi-context systems (Giunchiglia and
Serafini, 1994) can be used as a means of linking architecture directly to implementation.
When used as advocated, multi-context systems can be considered as being made up of four ele-
ments. The first element is the set of contexts, each of which corresponds to some architectural unit (in
the example given in the paper there are separate contexts for an agent’s beliefs, desires and intentions,
and a fourth context to handle communication). The second element is the set of logics employed by
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the contexts; typically different contexts use different logics. The third element is the set of sets of
sentences written in the relevant logics, placed in the contexts and which make up the knowledge
base of the agent. The final element is the set of bridge rules which state how information may be
transfered from context to context (broadly speaking they are rules of inference with antecedents and
consequents in different contexts which state what may be inferred in one context from what is prov-
able in others). The big advantage of specifying agents in this way is that because it is possible to write
theorem provers for multi-context systems (indeed such systems already exist) the agent specification
may be directly executed thus bridging the gap between architecture and implementation.
Next, Ndumu described work at BT Laboratories, in collaboration with Nwana, Lee and Collis,
on the ZEUS toolkit which was developed to provide a rapid-engineering environment for developers
of distributed collaborative agent systems. The toolkit comprises a suite of Java classes that help
users to develop agent-based applications by integrating and extending some predefined classes. The
design philosophy behind the toolkit was to delineate domain-level problem-solving abilities from
agent-level functionality. Thus, the toolkit provides classes that implement generic agent functionality
such as communication, coordination, planning, scheduling, task execution, monitoring and exception
handling, and ontology management. Developers are expected to provide the code that implements
the agents’ domain-level problem solving abilities. The main components of the toolkit include an
agent component library, a set of visualisation tools, and agent building software. The toolkit also
provides utility agents such as nameservers, and visualisers.
The agent building software implements a suite of editors that enables users to interactively create
agents by specifying their required attributes through visual programming. The main editors include
an Ontology Editor for defining the ontology for the domain; a Task Editor for describing the plan-
ning operators and reaction scripts of agents; a Definition Editor for defining the attributes of an agent,
such as the tasks it can perform and its set of initial resources; an Organisation Editor for specifying
any known relationships between agents; and a Coordination Editor for selecting the required coordi-
nation strategies for agents and for defining custom negotiation protocols. Finally, there is the Code
Generation Editor that inherits code from the Agent Component Library and integrates it with data
from the various editors to output Java code implementing the specified agents.
The visualisation tools are facilities of the dedicated “visualiser agent” that enables users to ob-
serve, control and debug their agents’ behaviour. The current set of tools includes a society tool that
shows the message interchange between agents in a society; a report tool that graphs the society-wide
decomposition of tasks and the execution states of the various subtasks; a micro tool for monitoring the
internal states of agents; a control tool for remotely modifying the internal states of individual agents,
and a statistics tool for collating individual agent and society-wide statistics. Nwana et al. (1998a;
1998b) provide more elaborate descriptions of the ZEUS Collaborative Agent Building Toolkit.
The second day began with an invited talk in which Binmore described work on game-theoretic
analyses of multi-agent systems, undertaken in collaboration with Vulcan at the ESRC Centre for
Economic Learning and Social Evolution at UCL. Interacting agents will try to satisfy only their
users’ goals and will no longer have a notion of global utility. Agents will, therefore, find themselves
in situations where they have an incentive to lie, or act tough, or exploit other strategic avenues not
usually associated with machines. Although the issues described above are relatively new to the AI
community, they closely resemble the models studied by economists and game theorists. The sub-field
of microeconomics known as game theory is widely acknowledged to provide the best available set of
tools for the design of multi-agent architectures (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994). However, because
existing theory is sometimes misunderstood or needs further development for computer applications,
researchers have been reluctant to use game theory and those that do, tend to miss out on the more
recent advances, which are likely to prove most useful in such settings, listed below.
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First, economic theory makes a distinction between models in which we analyse the optimal be-
haviour of individuals or firms given the underlying mechanism (or rules of the game), and models in
which we study optimal mechanism design, given that agents behave optimally. In the current early
stages of multi-agent design these two approaches are being developed simultaneously. One cannot
compare two different protocols (mechanisms) without specifying the behaviour of the interacting
agents. Similarly, one cannot design optimising agents without some information about the proto-
cols governing their interaction. Second, the revelation principle of mechanism design applies also
to agent design, and so the designer of a properly engineered agent can tell his client that his pro-
gramming takes care of all the strategic problems involved in bargaining optimally. Third, once each
agent has the necessary data from his client, there is no need, in principle, for any simulation of the
bargaining process. Game theory should provide a prediction of the outcome that would follow the
use of optimal strategies that can be employed immediately. The prediction that game theorists make
must constitute an equilibrium of the chosen protocol, otherwise new exploitative agents will be able
to invade and disrupt the system. Fourthly, it provides a classification of interacting situations based
on their extensive forms. It enables us to say that two, seemingly different, situations are strategically
equivalent because they can be translated into the same game form.
Economic agents have been criticised in the past as being more like computer programs than real
human beings, so it is interesting to see just how useful such models could be in the design of agents
and protocols. Initial experience shows that existing models still need to be considerably modified to
become useful in these new settings.
In the first paper of the paper presentations, van Eijk described work in collaboration with de Boer,
van der Hoek and Meyer at Utrecht University on a new multi-agent system programming language
to address the concern that existing languages do not have the expressiveness to present concurrency
issues in a clear, modular structure. The reason for this lack of modularity can in most cases be found
in the complications caused by the interactions with the various agent features that are being covered.
This claim is supported by the fact that most of the existing multi-agent languages are not yet fully
underpinned by a clear semantic description.
In order to develop a multi-agent programming language that is both well-structured and well-
understood from a semantical point of view, the authors advocate an incremental approach of design-
ing such a language and start from the programming paradigms of Communicating Sequential Pro-
cesses (CSP) (Hoare, 1978) and Concurrent Constraint Programming (CCP) (Saraswat and Rinard,
1990). The former view of a distributed system is as a set of synchronous value-passing processing,
while the latter is as set of asynchronous processes which access a global store of information. By
generalising the concept of value-passing to a general mechanism of information-passing, it is possi-
ble to obtain a programming paradigm for multi-agent systems in which the agents interact with each
other by passing information along a network of communication channels. Secondly, they interact
with a global source of information, which models the agents’ environment; the agents observe as
well as manipulate this common environment.
In this language, agents are defined by a programmed behaviour (consisting of primitive com-
munication actions), an expertise denoting the section of the environment that can be inspected and
manipulated, and an informational attitude consisting of information on their own expertise and that
of others. The operational semantics of the language is defined in terms of a transition system, which
constitutes an appreciated mechanism for the formal derivation of computations. However, one pos-
sible option for future research would be the transformation of this operational characterisation to a
compositional description of the language, as well trying to incorporate temporal semantic descrip-
tions necessary to describe the on-going nature of multi-agent systems.
Like CSP and CCP, pi-calculus is a well-developed and understood language for specifying and
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verifying the behaviour of distributed systems. In the next talk, rather than using it as the basis for a
new agent language, Padget and his co-author Bradford at the University of Bath presented a use of the
formalism to define a Spanish fish market an example of an electronic market system and to investigate
its suitability in defining similar systems in general. It complements earlier work on development of
prototypes of the fish market (Rodriguez et al., 1997).
The players (auctioneer, buyers, buyers’ manager, sellers, sellers’ manager, accountant) and scenes
(admission, auction and settlement) comprising the fish market are modelled in the specification. Fish
loads are presented on a conveyer belt and, while the auctioneer calls out details of the lots, the de-
creasing sequence is displayed on a large electronic scoreboard overhead. Buyers are issued with
electronic control boxes bearing a button which, when pressed, stops the descending count and iden-
tifies which box was responsible. It is this control box which inspired the introduction of the remote
control process, bringing numerous benefits with it. In particular, the auctioneer now need not be ac-
cessible to (electronic) buyers and so is not subject to interference from them. More importantly, the
remote control serves as a mechanism capable of preventing manipulation of the auction by premature
bidding, foot-dragging and spoofing.
There were several lessons learned in building a specification of this market place. For example,
it is important to start simply and refine incrementally since the pi-calculus offers no modularisation
mechanisms. Further, it is suggested that descriptions are caged in an asynchronous style, that chan-
nels should be unidirectional and for one purpose, and that channel naming should be done carefully
and systematically. The experience of using the pi-calculus suggests that it is probably best applied at
the level of defining the interaction architecture for a given scenario. This leads to a skeletal structure
into which higher functions such as negotiation and argumentation can be introduced, but which do
not then have to concern themselves with the low level aspects of communication, while offering the
opportunity for verification of the foundations of the system.
As well as specifying agent interactions and the protocols between them as described above it is
also necessary to consider how the most effective and efficient protocol or communication strategy can
be selected from a set of alternatives. The final presentation of the session, by Preist and Pearson of
HP Laboratories, was concerned with the performance of different messaging protocols in multi-agent
systems.
In this work service provision is considered in which one agent has a task which it cannot carry
out itself and must be matched with another agent, the service provider, which is able to carry out this
task for it, possibly receiving some payment. A simple example is considered to isolate the form of
this problem. In it there are providers of a given service, each giving the same quality of service, and
receiving no payment. Each provider may be unavailable; it has a probability p of being unavailable at
any given time, and is unavailable for a given number of seconds on average. A group of clients make,
on average, a certain number of requests per second to these providers. The clients receive contact
information from a facilitator agent, acting in recommend mode.
Several protocols are examined such as Naive Broadcast, where a client receives a list of all
providers from the facilitator, and broadcasts its request to all of them. Those providers currently
available reply, and the client chooses one of them. In addition Naive One to One and Informed One
to One are considered and it is shown that the naive one to one protocol is more efficient than the naive
broadcast for high values of p, and vice versa for low values. Since the parameters may vary with time,
however, it is not possible to say in advance which of the protocols will be most efficient for a given
problem. Instead, the authors propose that this decision is made dynamically by the agent community.
They have demonstrated mathematically and subsequently checked experimentally that if each agent
chooses the protocol that will minimise the total number of messages it sends and receives, then the
community as a whole will choose the protocol which is most efficient. Thus the works suggests that
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protocol choices can more effectively be made dynamically in response to a changing environment
rather than being built in at design time.
In addition to these presentations, several participants took the opportunity to present ongoing work
in short talks, contributing to the general atmosphere. Overall, FoMAS’97 provided an occasion for
constructive and engaging presentations and discussions in a well-focussed and informal forum. The
continuing success of the workshop in bringing together industrialists and academics in a fruitful way,
has led to what we anticipate will be a series of annual workshops to support activity in the field,
and encourage closer links. The third workshop in the series will be held in Manchester in December
1998, chaired by Michael Fisher of Manchester Metropolitan University, under the new name of the
UK Special Interest Group on Multi-Agent Systems, broadening its scope. Details can be found at
http://www.dcs.warwick.ac.uk/fomas
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